Ethiopia’s Executive Presidency Proposal Puts National Dialogue Legitimacy on Trial

Ethiopia’s national dialogue has endorsed one of the most consequential constitutional ideas in the country’s recent history: replacing the current prime minister-led system with an executive presidency. Africanews, citing AFP, reported on August 31 that more than 4,000 delegates backed a proposal to merge the powers of the prime minister and the largely ceremonial president into a single executive presidency. The recommendation could be presented to parliament when it reconvenes in October.

The proposal has not yet changed the constitution. But it has already changed the political debate. Supporters say a presidential system could create a leader who represents the whole country rather than one parliamentary constituency or regional political base. Critics warn that it could concentrate power around Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and weaken the checks that still exist inside Ethiopia’s already strained political system.

The timing is sensitive. Ethiopia is emerging from a June election in which Abiy’s Prosperity Party won overwhelmingly, while critics and international observers raised concerns over restrictions on parties and media. The country also faces armed conflict and instability in Oromia and Amhara, unresolved tensions in Tigray, and deep disagreements over the federal bargain that has shaped Ethiopian politics since the 1995 constitution.

What the proposal would change

Under Ethiopia’s current constitution, executive power rests with the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, who are responsible to the House of Peoples’ Representatives. The president is head of state but largely ceremonial. The proposal backed by dialogue delegates would combine the two offices, creating a more powerful presidency selected through a parliament dominated by the ruling party, according to Africanews and Africa Briefing summaries of AFP reporting.

That shift would be more than administrative. It would redefine how executive authority is anchored, how parliament checks government, and how regions view their relationship with the centre. Ethiopia’s political system is built around a federal constitution that recognizes nationalities and regional states. Moving to an executive presidency could either create a clearer national leadership structure or deepen fears that power is being centralised at the expense of regions and opposition groups.

Supporters argue that the current parliamentary system ties the head of government too closely to a specific constituency and ethnic-political base. In their view, a national presidency could symbolically stand above regional fragmentation and help rebuild unity. That argument cannot be dismissed in a country marked by violent conflict, ethnic mobilisation and disputes over identity. But symbolism is not enough. The design of the office, method of selection, term limits, impeachment rules, parliamentary oversight and judicial independence would determine whether the change unifies or concentrates power.

Why critics see a power grab

The central criticism is that reform could become a vehicle for one person’s consolidation. Africanews quoted political analyst Befekadu Hailu warning that the proposal could allow Abiy to assume the new executive presidency while concentrating power in a single office. Africa Briefing also reported that critics see parallels with Turkey, where Recep Tayyip Erdogan moved from prime minister to an empowered presidency.

Comparisons between countries should be used carefully, but the concern is understandable. Constitutional changes made after a ruling party landslide can look less like neutral reform and more like institutional redesign by the side already holding power. Ethiopia’s parliament is dominated by the Prosperity Party. If that parliament chooses the executive president, the reform may not create a broader national mandate unless selection rules and safeguards are credible.

The current premiership has no simple numerical term limit in the same way some presidential systems do, while Ethiopia’s ceremonial presidency has constitutional term limits. If a new executive presidency is created, term length and limits will be central. A reform that introduces clear limits, stronger checks and transparent selection could be defended as institutional modernization. A reform that leaves vague succession rules or weak accountability would intensify fears of permanent incumbency.

The legitimacy problem

The national dialogue itself is under scrutiny. Africanews reported that key opposition parties boycotted the process and armed groups were excluded. More than 4,000 delegates participated in weeks of talks that ended on August 22, but participation numbers do not settle the legitimacy question. The core issue is whether the groups most capable of blocking peace or contesting constitutional change were inside the process.

Merera Gudina, chairman of the Caucus of Opposition Parties, said the dialogue could not guarantee Ethiopia’s two pressing needs: lasting peace and democratic governance, according to Africanews. Peace-building expert Naga Tesfaye argued that recommendations should be accompanied by negotiations involving the government, armed groups and opposition parties to end ongoing violence. That is the practical gap: a dialogue can propose institutions, but conflict actors and excluded political forces can still reject the outcome.

Ethiopia’s conflicts are not peripheral to constitutional reform. The insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara, the fragile postwar situation in Tigray, and disputes over regional autonomy are all connected to how power is distributed. A constitutional overhaul that does not engage those tensions directly may create a document that passes through parliament but fails to build consent.

Addis Ababa and federal tensions

One of the most contentious issues during the dialogue was the status of Addis Ababa. The capital is constitutionally self-governing but surrounded by Oromia, whose political actors have long claimed special interest in the city and its surrounding areas. Africanews reported that some delegates walked out during discussions on the issue, showing how unresolved the question remains.

This matters because a presidential-system debate cannot be separated from Ethiopia’s federal structure. If executive power is strengthened at the centre while disputes over land, identity, language, city status and regional boundaries remain unresolved, opponents may see the reform as centralisation by another name. Supporters may argue that central leadership is necessary to overcome fragmentation, but the risk is that centralisation without consent produces more resistance.

The dialogue also reportedly recommended reducing state funding for ethnic-based political parties in favour of parties with broader national focus. This could encourage cross-regional politics, but it could also be interpreted as weakening parties that represent specific nationalities. Ethiopia’s challenge is to build national institutions without denying the political identities that the federal system was designed to recognize.

What parliament must do

If the recommendations go to parliament in October, the process will be as important as the text. Parliament should publish the proposals clearly, allow broad public review, hear opposition and civil society submissions, and explain the constitutional amendment pathway. A rushed vote would damage legitimacy. A transparent process would not eliminate disagreement, but it would reduce the perception that reform is being imposed.

Several design questions need public answers. Would the executive president be elected directly by citizens or indirectly by parliament? What term limit would apply? Could a sitting prime minister immediately assume the office? What powers would remain with parliament? How would regional states be protected? What would happen to the Council of Ministers? How would courts review executive actions? How would emergency powers be limited?

These are not technical details. They define whether the reform creates accountability or only rearranges titles. Ethiopia’s recent history shows that institutional ambiguity can become conflict fuel. Clear rules matter.

Regional implications

Ethiopia is not just another domestic political case. It is Africa’s second-most populous country, the seat of the African Union, a major Horn of Africa security actor and a central state in Nile Basin politics. Its internal constitutional direction affects regional diplomacy, refugee movements, trade corridors and security calculations involving Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Egypt.

A stable and more inclusive Ethiopian political system would benefit the region. A more centralised system seen as excluding opposition and armed groups could deepen instability. The Horn of Africa already faces overlapping pressures: Sudan’s war, Red Sea militarisation, Somalia’s security challenges, Nile water disputes and economic fragility. Ethiopia’s constitutional debate will be watched closely because domestic legitimacy is tied to regional predictability.

International partners should avoid treating the executive presidency proposal as a narrow legal issue. The key question is whether it helps end violence and expand political participation. If reform proceeds without an inclusive peace track, donors and regional actors may find themselves dealing with a constitutionally stronger executive facing unresolved conflict on the ground.

The bottom line

Ethiopia’s executive presidency proposal could become a serious attempt to redesign national leadership, but only if it is handled with transparency, safeguards and broader inclusion. At present, the legitimacy problem is substantial. A national dialogue that excludes key opposition and armed actors cannot by itself settle the country’s constitutional future.

The next phase should not be a race to parliamentary approval. It should be a test of whether government can open the process, answer hard design questions and link constitutional reform to peace negotiations. Ethiopia needs institutions that reduce conflict, not structures that convert a ruling-party majority into permanent central control.

The proposal now places Abiy Ahmed and parliament at a clear choice point. They can use the dialogue recommendation to build a broader constitutional conversation, or they can push ahead in a way that confirms the fears of critics. The future of Ethiopia’s federal bargain may depend on which route they choose.

Sources

• Africanews – Ethiopia backs executive presidency plan, raising fears of power grab, 31 August 2026
• Africa Briefing – Ethiopia presidency plan sparks power fears, 31 August 2026
• Borkena – National Dialogue delegates agree on presidential system and land reform, 24 August 2026
• Chatham House – Ethiopia needs more than an election to calm internal and regional conflict, May 2026
• WIPO Lex – Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
• Ethiopia Insight – Ethiopia’s National Dialogue could unravel the federal bargain, 18 July 2026