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Zambia’s SecOps Push Turns Cybersecurity Into a Critical Infrastructure Test

Zambia's latest cybersecurity push brings government, industry and technology partners together around SecOps, digital trust and protection of critical infrastructure.

Zambia's SecOps Push Turns Cybersecurity Into a Critical Infrastructure Test
Afrique australe — B-Empire Magazine

Zambia’s latest cybersecurity push signals a broader shift in how African governments are beginning to treat digital risk: not as a back-office technology problem, but as a test of national resilience, industrial continuity and public trust. On September 2, CAJ News Africa reported that Zambia is deepening collaboration with Fortinet, Micronics Consulting and QBS Software Africa through security operations, known as SecOps, as the country tries to strengthen its ability to detect, manage and respond to cyber threats.

The immediate trigger was a technical seminar in Lusaka focused on operational technology security and security operations. The gathering brought together government, industry, academia and technology-sector representatives to examine how Zambia can protect digital assets and the industrial systems that increasingly sit behind power, telecommunications, transport, financial services and public administration.

The message from the Ministry of Technology and Science was direct. Dr Brilliant Habeenzu, the ministry’s permanent secretary, said Zambia’s expanding digital economy is creating new risks alongside new economic opportunities. According to the CAJ report, he pointed to mobile internet subscriptions of about 4.7 million by the end of 2025 and warned that cybersecurity is now linked to economic security, national security, business continuity and public trust.

Why SecOps matters

SecOps is not simply a new label for cybersecurity spending. It describes the practical merger of security teams and IT operations teams so that organisations can see threats faster, understand their impact, and respond before incidents spread. For a country such as Zambia, the concept matters because digital transformation is no longer limited to websites, mobile applications or internal government systems. It increasingly touches physical infrastructure.

That is the central policy issue. A cyber incident in a bank can disrupt payments. A breach in a telecommunications network can affect emergency communication and business activity. An attack on an energy or transport system can move from the digital environment into the physical economy. The more Zambia digitises, the more cybersecurity becomes part of the basic operating capacity of the state and private sector.

This is why operational technology, or OT, is now part of the conversation. OT refers to the systems that monitor and control physical equipment, industrial processes and infrastructure. These systems were often built for reliability and continuity, not for exposure to modern digital threats. As African economies connect more industrial assets to digital networks, the old separation between cyber policy and infrastructure policy becomes harder to defend.

A strong score is not a finished job

Zambia has reasons to present itself as a serious cybersecurity actor. The country recorded a 92.6 percent score on the Global Cybersecurity Index in 2024, according to the CAJ report. The International Telecommunication Union describes the index as a global reference for assessing national cybersecurity commitment across five pillars: legal measures, technical measures, organisational measures, capacity development and cooperation.

That framework is useful because it shows why cybersecurity is broader than software procurement. A country needs laws, but laws alone do not stop intrusions. It needs technical capacity, but technical tools are weak without trained people. It needs institutions, but institutions must coordinate. It needs public reporting systems, but people and businesses must trust that reporting cyber incidents will lead to help rather than blame.

Habeenzu’s warning that Zambia cannot rest on its score is therefore important. A strong ranking can create confidence, but it can also create complacency. Cyber threats change quickly, and attackers do not wait for governments to complete multi-year reform plans. The value of Zambia’s current push is that it treats the 2024 score as a foundation rather than an endpoint.

The business case

For businesses, the Lusaka discussions should be read as more than a government policy update. Cyber resilience is becoming a competitiveness issue. Companies that cannot protect customer data, payment systems, logistics networks and industrial equipment will face higher insurance costs, reputational damage, operational downtime and weaker investor confidence.

This is particularly important as Zambia tries to position digital services, mining, energy, logistics and finance as engines of growth. Investors may focus first on power supply, regulation, currency risk and tax policy, but cybersecurity is increasingly part of due diligence. A market that can protect digital infrastructure is easier to trust. A market where incidents are hidden, enforcement is unclear and public systems are vulnerable carries hidden costs.

Private-sector partnerships can help, but they need to be structured carefully. Companies such as Fortinet, Micronics Consulting and QBS Software Africa bring tools, training and practical threat knowledge. Government brings policy direction, convening power and national-security responsibility. The risk is that cybersecurity becomes a fragmented purchasing exercise, with each institution buying products in isolation. The stronger approach is to build shared standards, common incident-response channels and skills that remain in Zambia after any single vendor engagement ends.

Public trust and civil liberties

Zambia’s cyber agenda also sits inside a sensitive political debate. CAJ News Africa reported in July that cyber legislation had become a point of friction between the government and civil society after the arrest of a journalist under the Cyber Crimes Act. Rights groups warned that some provisions could be used in ways that threaten media freedom and freedom of expression, while government officials argued that digital platforms must not be misused for unlawful recording, misinformation or reputational harm.

This tension is not unique to Zambia. Across Africa, governments are trying to respond to real cybercrime, fraud, disinformation and online abuse while also facing criticism that cyber laws can become tools for political control. The policy challenge is to protect networks without criminalising legitimate journalism, political scrutiny or public-interest disclosure.

That distinction matters for cybersecurity itself. Public trust is not a soft add-on. If citizens, journalists, businesses and civil society organisations fear that cyber reporting mechanisms or digital laws will be used selectively, cooperation weakens. People may avoid reporting incidents. Companies may hide breaches. Whistleblowers may stay silent. A strong cybersecurity system requires confidence that enforcement is lawful, proportionate and independently accountable.

AI raises the stakes

The threat environment is also changing because artificial intelligence is making cyber and information risks faster and cheaper to scale. Zambia has already faced warnings about AI-generated content during the political season, and African businesses are dealing with the same global shift affecting every market: phishing becomes more convincing, fake audio and video become easier to produce, and attackers can automate reconnaissance against weak systems.

This is where SecOps becomes more than a technical discipline. Organisations need visibility across networks, but they also need decision-making processes that can separate routine alerts from systemic threats. They need people who understand both technology and operational consequences. A suspicious login at a government agency, a malware incident at a telecoms site and an intrusion at an energy facility may require very different responses, but all can have public consequences.

The best cybersecurity programmes therefore combine prevention, detection, response and recovery. Prevention reduces obvious weaknesses. Detection finds what slips through. Response limits the damage. Recovery determines whether essential services can return quickly. For African economies where downtime can have direct social and business costs, recovery planning is as important as perimeter defence.

Regional significance

Zambia’s approach has wider African relevance because the continent’s digital systems are increasingly connected across borders. Mobile money, regional banking, logistics corridors, cloud services, energy trading, cross-border telecoms and digital public infrastructure all depend on trust. A cyber weakness in one market can affect partners, customers and institutions elsewhere.

That makes cooperation one of the most important parts of the ITU framework. African countries need domestic capability, but they also need regional intelligence sharing, harmonised reporting practices and stronger links between regulators, law-enforcement bodies and private infrastructure operators. Cybercrime does not respect national borders. Neither should cyber resilience planning.

Zambia’s latest seminar will matter only if it leads to implementation. Useful next steps would include regular national cyber exercises, stronger public incident reporting, clearer protection for responsible disclosure, specialised training for OT environments, and practical guidance for small and medium-sized businesses that cannot afford large security teams. The government should also ensure that cyber laws are applied with safeguards that protect constitutional freedoms.

The bottom line

Zambia’s SecOps push is a necessary response to a digital economy that is becoming more valuable and more exposed. The country’s high Global Cybersecurity Index score gives it a platform, but the real test is operational: whether ministries, companies, infrastructure operators and citizens can work together when threats move quickly.

The strongest cybersecurity posture will not come from technology alone. It will come from trusted institutions, skilled people, transparent laws, resilient infrastructure and partnerships that build local capacity. Zambia is right to treat cybersecurity as economic security and national resilience. The next task is to make sure that protection of digital systems also protects the openness and trust on which a healthy digital economy depends.

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